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ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

the matter of exemptions exclusively to the states." The prospect of the
Court, and not the Congress, fashioning a "national, uniform exemption
policy by placing limitations on the meaning of the word 'property' as
used in section 70a(5) of the Act" 5 on a piecemeal basis is hardly appealing. Unfortunately, however, such a prospect would appear likely in
the wake of the Lines decision.
E. CADER HOWARD

Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in Federal Courts
In Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.,1 a federal
court was recently called upon to decide whether to apply the state or federal rule on enforcement of foreign judgments. The court had jurisdiction
by reason of international diversity, 2 held that the choice of law was
governed by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,8 and applied the state rule.
This note will explore the issue of whether Erie should be controlling with
respect to enforcement of foreign judgments when the court has jurisdiction by reason of international, as opposed to intra-national, diversity
of citizenship.
The Somportex case has a rather complex background. Somportex
originally brought suit against Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corporation
for an alleged breach of contract. The suit was brought in England, and
the defendant was served at its offices in Pennsylvania. The defendant
made a conditional appearance in the English court and sought an order
"Am. BANxR. L.J. 117. See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958) ;
Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); Dixon v. Koplar, 102 F.2d 295
(8th Cir. 1939). In the last case it was observed that
the rights of a bankrupt to property as exempt are those given him by the
state statutes; and the federal courts, sitting as courts in bankruptcy, will
determine exemptions according to those statutes, and the decisions of the
courts of last resort of the states construing and applying those statutes.
Id. at 297.
" Am.BANXa. L.J. 117.
318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

"The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions .. .
between-(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State, and foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof.

. . ."

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).

The first clause

provides for intra-national diversity jurisdiction, and the second for international
diversity jurisdiction.
'304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Court held that in a diversity case a federal
court must apply the substantive law of the state in which it is sitting.
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setting aside the original writ for lack of jurisdiction,4 alleging that none
of the English grounds for extraterritorial service of process existed.
The defendant then withdrew from his own hearing and suffered a default
judgment on the issue of jurisdiction. When the defendant petitioned to
withdraw his original conditional appearance because of mistake, he won
in the lower court but lost on the plaintiff's appeal. Thereupon the defendant completely withdrew from the case and suffered a default judgment on the merits.' Somportex involved the plaintiff's attempt to enforce
this judgment in the federal court.
The Somportex court analyzed this situation as one in which the
default judgment was based on personal jurisdiction over the defendant
obtained through his appearance in the English court.' Therefore, the
English court's determination that the defendant made a knowing appearance was given full effect.'
The court then held state law controlling as to whether reciprocity was
required for enforcement of foreign judgments,' and "found" that, were
the state court to be confronted with this problem, it would not require
reciprocityf Finding no genuine issue as to any material fact, the court
'318 F. Supp. at 162.
Id. at 163.

eThe court characterized the fact situation in Somportex as a hybrid of the

two usual foreign-judgment cases. The first is the case in which a defendant has
taken no action in the foreign court and is free to attack collaterally the foreign
court's determination of jurisdiction. The second arises when the defendant makes
a conditional appearance to litigate the issue of jurisdiction, loses on this issue,
and withdraws. The court reasoned that in the latter situation the jurisdictional
issue cannot be re-examined by the court asked to enforce the judgment. The
court said:
Unlike the first situation, the defendant has taken some action in England.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum entered a conditional apearance, which after
final litigation ... has since become a general appearance. However, unlike the second situation, the defendant has not litigated the underlying
jurisdictional basis for the suit.
318 F. Supp. at 164. The court noted that "full faith and credit" would prevent
an inquiry into the issue of jurisdiction if the judgment were that of a sister state,

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), and that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNFLICTS OF LAWS § 98 (Proposed Official Draft, May 2, 1967) called for

recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 318 F. Supp. at 164.
1318 F. Supp. at 165. Because of some unfortunate choices on the defendant's
part, the plaintiff never had to prove even the jurisdictional aspects of his original
suit.
'In Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966), another lower
federal court cited Erie and held that state law controlled whether a foreign judgment would be enforced without reciprocity. However, in that case the state lav
concurred with the federal rule, giving the foreign judgment only prima facie weight.
' Pennsylvania had not ruled directly on the issue of whether reciprocity was
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granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.10
The court recognized that the federal rule, as stated in Hilton v.
Guyot," requires reciprocity as a condition precedent to enforcement of
foreign judgments; the United States will not enforce a foreign judgment
unless a court of the nation rendering the judgment would give like effect
to an American judgment. However, the court noted that Hilton was
decided before Erie and went on to say: "It is clear . . .that the law
governing the enforceability of foreign judgments by a federal court is the
law of the state where the court is located."'12 It does not seem entirely
"clear" that Erie requires this conclusion. Erie involved intra-national,
rather than international, diversity jurisdiction. 3 Moreover, the question
of enforcement of foreign judgments involves federal interests, and later
cases explaining Erie have tended to limit its reach in areas involving
federal interests.: 4
Thus there are two important and distinct questions which the court
in Somportex could have considered but did not: first, whether Erie was
intended to apply in cases of international diversity where there is a
special federal interest involved; and second, whether enforcement of
foreign judgments is of such federal importance that it might be considered a "federal question." Although the resolution of these two issues
would involve similar considerations of the federal interest; a decision
for one or the other would bring about completely different results. If
it were found that Erie simply did not apply, the federal courts could
apply federal law but the state courts could apply different state law.
If this were held to be a federal question, then the federal decision would
be binding on the state courts as well. 15
Whether Erie should have applied in Somporte%turns upon the reach
of the Erie rule and the policies behind it. At first blush, not to apply the
state law would seem to fly directly in the face of the Erie rule. In Erie,
the Court said that where jurisdiction is based on diversity, "[e]xcept in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
required, so the federal court was forced to decide as it felt the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would. Were the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to confront this
problem later and reach a different conclusion, the federal courts in Pennsylvania
would then be bound by that decision.
10318 F. Supp. at 169.

159 U.S. 113 (1895).
318 F. Supp. at 167.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938).
1"See,
e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 60 (2d ed. 1970). '
1

10
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law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."" There was no
exclusion for international diversity and an examination of the policies
underlying Erie shows that such an exclusion would normally be undesirable." The Erie Court wanted to prevent nonresidents from having
a choice of law which they could exercise simply by bringing suit in the
most favorable forum, whether state or federal. If the court in Somportex
had not applied the state law as to reciprocity, it would have created a situation in which a nonresident could choose between a federal and state
forum and thus decide whether reciprocity would be required. 8 However,
with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments, there may be a federal
interest sufficient to justify the application of federal law. Although in
Erie the Court felt that uniformity of the substantive law applied by
the courts located in a state was more important than national federal
uniformity,' 9 in a Somportex situation the Court might feel otherwise.
The inequities of forum shopping within a state may be outweighed by
the desire to have a uniform federal rule in international dealings.2 0 The
Court in Erie said that the state law "rests expressly on a local policy...
dictated by local conditions."'" A state law dealing with enforcement of
foreign judgments obviously has other than local ramifications.
Several cases decided subsequent to Erie have shed light on the
question of whether Erie should apply. Klaxon Co. 'v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co., 2 cited in Somportexl, held that the federal courts
must apply state choice-of-law rules when jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 24 the Court interpreted the
Erie rule very broadly and held that the federal courts in diversity cases
304 U.S. at 78.

7The

fact that diversity between the parties was international rather intra-

national should not, in itself, require a different choice of law rule. In the ordinary
contracts action, as opposed to one for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, there
is no rational reason for having a different choice of law in the federal court simply
because one of the parties is an alien.
8
Ifthe nonresident brought the suit in state court, the resident defendant could
not remove if jurisdiction was based on diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
19 304 U.S. at 75.
20 Reciprocity in enforcement of the judgments of the United States and a foreign country would best be obtained by a treaty. Then the supremacy clause of the

Constitution would require all courts in the United States to give that treaty effect.
U.S. Co Ts. art. VI. However, if state law controls both the state and federal
courts, and state laws do not require reciprocity, there will be little incentive to a
foreign country to make any such treaty.
21304 U.S. at 68.
20313 U.S. 487 (1941).
23
2'

318 F.Supp. at 164.
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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must operate as just another court of the state in which the federal courts
are situated. GuarantyTrust introduced the "outcome-determinative" test
for deciding when state law must be applied-whenever the use of a
particular rule can significantly affect the outcome of the litigation, state
law must be applied.' Klaxon and Guaranty Trust tend to support the
proposition that Erie should apply, but later cases have defined the Erie
rule more narrowly and have expanded the situations in which federal
courts will use federal law. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative' Oheld
that outcome is not the only consideration, and that when there is a
strong federal policy against the application of the state rule -the federal
court may apply the federal rule, even though it has an effect on the outcome. Then, in Hannav. Plumer,2 7 the Court held that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are controlling on the federal courts, even in the face
of conflicting and outcome-determinative state rules. In Hannathe Court
cited Byrd for the proposition that the Guaranty Trust outcome-determinative test "was never intended to serve as a talisman,"2 and that the
choice between federal and state law can not be made by " 'litmus paper'
criterion but rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule.'"
This statement and the Byrd holding (permitting the application of
outcome-determinative federal rules in some instances) indicate that in
the Court's view the Erie policies do not foreclose the application of federal
law just because to do so might encourage forum shopping between the
state and federal courts.
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,"0 the Court held that federal
courts do not have to apply state law regarding liability on commercial
paper issued by the United States because, on the Clearfield facts, the
"application of state law ... would subject the rights and duties of the
United States to exceptional uncertainty,"3' and "[t]he desirability of a
uniform rule is plain."32 The jurisdiction in Clearfield was based on the
United States being a party and thus the federal interest is more readily
apparent, but Clearfield still tends to show that the Court does not mean
for Erie to apply where national uniformity is an important factor.
Therefore, if enforcement of foreign judgments were considered by the
25 Id. at 109.
2"6356 U.S. 525 (1958).
*'380
U.S. 460 (1965).
8Id. at
466-67.
Id. at 467.
'° 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
1
' Id. at 367.
82

id.
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Court to be an area of substantial federal concern, in which federal uniformity was an important consideration, Byrd and Clearfield could be
cited to support the contention that Erie is inapplicable in that area.
However, the fact remains that to allow federal courts to apply federal
law is an affront to the most basic policy of Erie-discouraging forum
shopping.
Finally, it must be considered whether the reciprocity issue is a federal
question. As previously noted, this inquiry involves many of the same
considerations underlying the issue of whether Erie applies at all, but it is
different in effect. If the issue of whether to require reciprocity for enforcement of foreign judgments is a federal question, the rule of decision
would be the same in all courts of the nation-state and federal-and
forum shopping would be eliminated entirely.
The reciprocity issue certainly does not fit the classical mold of a
federal question, since it is not controlled by the Constitution and there
is no applicable federal statute or treaty." Therefore, if federal law is to
control it must be federal common law, which the Court has applied in
several other instances. On the same day that Erie was handed down,
the Court held in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co." that federal common law must be applied to determined the rights of
two states through which an interstate stream passed. Federal common
law was used in Clearfield, in which the United States was a party and
government paper was involved. In Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co. 5 and Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,"0
the Court applied federal common law in areas related to those dominated
by federal statutory law. And, in cases of admiralty and maritime law,
the Court has used federal common law to achieve uniformity8 7
The. case closest to the Somportex fact pattern in which the court
has applied federal common law is Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino.8 8
Therein the Court refused to be bound by Erie and made its own interpretation of the "act of state" doctrine, 9 saying, "the Court did not have
" Note 20 supra. Judgment-enforcing treaties are clearly legal under international law. France has several, though none with the United States. Lorenzen,
The Enforcement of American Judgnwnts Abroad, 29 YALE L.J. 188, 194 n.33
(1919).
304 U.S. 92 (1938).
"317 U.S. 173 (1942).
36353 U.S. 448 (1957).

Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-17 (1917).
'376 U.S. 398 (1964).
'"The "act of state" doctrine has it that "'the courts of one country will not
"E.g.,
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rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins."4 The Court also stated that "an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law." 4' There is in this statement at least the implication that
questions concerning foreign relations are issues of federal common law.42
Arguably, Banco Nacional affords a springboard for the application of
federal common law in Somportex. The Court in Banco Nacional used
federal common law because the rule it was concerned with affected our
affairs with foreign nations, and it saw in the Constitution and federal
laws a concern for uniformity in this area. 43 Somportex, too, could be
thought to have international ramifications. Encouraging nations to give
our judgments effect in their courts is a legitimate federal objective
which would be advanced by a national policy of reciprocity. In Banco
Nacional, there was no federal law directly involved nor any firm indication from Congress that federal decisions were desired in this area, but the
Court applied federal common law nevertheless.44
If the court in Somportex had considered the course indicated by
Banco Nacional, it could have decided that the issue of whether to require
reciprocity for enforcement of foreign judgments is a federal question.
The states would then be bound by the federal rule, forum shopping would
be prevented, and a uniform approach in an area of national interest would
be facilitated.
BRUCE J. DOWNEY, III

Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Residence Requirements
The United States Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson' held
that a one-year residence requirement which denied otherwise qualified
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory."' Id. at 416.
40 376 U.S. at 425.

" Id.
"'See Comment, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional
Approach to Erie, 74 YATE L.J. 325 (1964).
40376 U.S. at 427 n.25.
"Id. at 416-27.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).

1

